I must admit that when the conflict between Russia and Georgia erupted in August of 2008, I didn’t know the history of the area at all. And because I didn’t know the history, I bought the story fed to us on the television and media that the war was wholly the fault of Russia invading poor helpless Georgia.
And in the months since then, I keep reading bits and pieces from various folks (Glen Greenwald being one of them. You should read him. http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/) that say it wasn’t anything near black and white, that Georgia had actually started the war and Russia had responded.
Recently, Colin Powell said Georgia started conflict with Russia.
The BBC reported that Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili, … sent troops to re-take control of this breakaway region (South Ossetia)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7562611.stm
The New York Times reported that Georgia attacked Russian and South Ossetian forces, and is currently trying to rebuild its army to launch another invasion.
Another article in the New York Times reported quite negatively on Georgia’s president Mikheil Saakashvili.
The government of Georgia, specifically it’s President, Mikheil Saakashvili, is authoritarian and suppresses its own people. Heavily armed Georgian police raided a news station that was critical of Saakashvili. Freedom House, a human rights group, ranked Georgia in terms of press freedom on a level with Colombia.
So I did some digging and found a BBC article from 2004 that profiles Saakashvili, describing him as a reformer, a crusader against corruption and an enemy of poverty. But even then, critics describe him as a demagogue and a populist with a strong lust for power
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3231852.stm
So, after hearing every possible description of Georgia’s president, I decided I needed to sit down and read up on Georgia. This is what I’ve found so far.
Saakashvili was one of the main instigators of the 2003 “Rose Revolution” against then Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. Parlimentary elections in November 2003 had been rigged by Shevardnadze. And Saakashvili was one of the opposition candidates running for parliment who lost the election. As the Georgian public became aware that the election had been rigged, they began to support the opposition parties in huge protests. Saakashivili and other leaders of the oppostiion parties interrupted Shevardnadze’s speech on the opening of the new parliment (they walked in carrying roses, thus the name of the revolution). Shevardnadze fled and attempted to declare a state of emergency. He ordered troops and police mobilized to keep him in power, but the military refused to support him. He resigned from power on November 23, 2003.
Eduard Shevardnadze held pro-Russian views, having served under Mikhail Gorbachev as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1990.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rose_Revolution
side note: How did Georgian President rig the election in November 2003? By wiping voter’s names from the registration lists. The Georgian authorities failed to produce reliable voter lists for the elections. This led to the defacto disenfranchisement of potentially significant numbers of voters, particularly in Tbilisi, Rustavi and Kutaisi cities. Areas where opposition candidates would do well.
http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/1593_en.pdf.html
If that doesn’t sound familiar, just look at what Republican party dogs are doing with voter registration lists, voter requirements, and other obstructions to democracy in areas where Democratic candidates are likely to be more popular.
So, after the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili became president of Georgia. He announced two major course changes for Georgia: That Georgia would become “pro-west” (where it had been fairly pro-Russian) and that Georgia would unify all its separate territories.
May 2004, a second “rose revolution”, sometimes called the “velvet revolution”, occurred in the Georgian province of Ajaria. Ajaria was an Autonomous Republic within Georgia, and was led by Aslan Abashidze. Aslan Abashidze and Eduard Shevardnadze had a “hands off” approach to each other. Eduard didn’t try to bring Aslan’s republic under Georgian control, and Aslan didn’t war against Eduard. When the Rose Revolution occurred, Aslan Abashidze saw his agreement with the Georgian government disappear. In reponse, Aslan Abashidze refused to recognize the Rose Revolution and the Georgian government put into power as a result. Aslan declared a state of emergency in Ajaria immediately after Eduard Shevardnadze resigned on 23 November 2003. Negotians between Aslan and the Georgian government went back and forth for some time.
In January 2004, Aslan Abashidze ordered police to crackdown on opposition leaders and protesters. Aslan Abashidze visited Moscow and the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement supporting Aslan Abashidze.
By February 2004, Aslan Abashidze ordered more police raids on the opposition movement’s political offices.
In March, Aslan Abashidze again went to Moscow, and during his absence Mikheil Saakashvili and several other Georgian authorities attempted to enter Ajaria. However, armed militants supporting Aslan Abashidze blocked the Choloki Bridge, prohibiting the Georgians from entering Ajaria. The militants claims that Mikheil Saakashvili was attempting to take control of Ajaria by force.
In response, Georgia imposed economic sanctions against Ajaria. Aslan Abashidze negotiated with Georgia to have the sanctions lifted.
By April, two Ajarian generals announced their refusal to follow Georgia’s orders, while a number of military personell left Ajaria for Georgia as did a number of Ajarian government officials.
At the end of April, Georgia launched its largest military training exercise ever, as a show of force to Ajaria, taking place just 30km from Ajaria’s border. In response, Ajaria blew up two bridges over the Choloki river that connected Ajaria with the rest of Georgia.
(for those familiar with the 2008 Georgian conflict, this should some somewhat familiar. Rather than bridges over rivers being the target, control of a tunnel through a mountain was the goal.)
In May 2004, an opposition protest was violently attacked by Ajarian police. This was a catalyst for larger protests, tens of thousands of people protesting against Aslan Abashidze. Georgian Special Forces entered the region and started to disarm pro-Abashizde militants. Secretary of the Russian Security Council Igor Ivanov arrived in the Adjarian capital Batumi. Abashidze stepped down after overnight talks with Ivanov and left for Moscow.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3693675.stm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Adjara_crisis
November 2004, one year after the Rose Revolution, Georgians lament Saakashvili’s moves to consolidate power to himself. Saakashvili initiated a constitutional amendment that would diminish the role of Parliament and give him more powers than any elected president has in any democratic state. The independent media that had been critical of the government under the old president, Eduard Shevardnadze, must now contend with the strong-arm tactics of the new government. Dozens of media outlets were shut down, including three television stations. Even the more popular political talk shows were discontinued and replaced.
Saakashvili labels those who speak out as traitors. Several critics have fared worse. The editor of an independent newspaper was arrested in the street for drug possession after criticizing a Saakashvili-appointed regional governor; needless to say he had no history of drug use. A member of Parliament had his home raided by the police, who, without a warrant, claimed to find a stockpile of arms in his children’s wardrobe.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/12/08/edkhidasheli_ed3_.php
From this point (November 2004) to the August 8 conflict, the interactions between Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia, all seem to be a continuation of the conflicts over who controls what territories in the area. Specifically, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were made Georgian territories after the Soviet collapse, but have large Russian populations. While Georgia identifies the territories as Georgian (and the current political maps support that notion), the populations of the territoris include a great number of people who identify themselves as more Russian than Georgian. This conflict exploded into a war between South Ossetia and Georgia in 1991, and an ugly war rife with war crimes between Abkhaz and Georgia in 1992, and the period from 2004 to 2008 can really only be viewed in the context of being a direct outcome of that earlier war.
In January 1991, Georgian military forces entered Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The Ossetian militants responded by firing at Georgian schools and houses in the city, while Georgians attacked Ossetian villages. Months later, Georgia imposed economic blockade on the rebel region: It disconnected electricity supplies to Tskhinvali and blocked the road by which the city received food and other products. The Ossetians blockaded Georgian villages and several atrocities occurred on both sides. Russian forces supported North and South Ossetia. By the time the war was over around June of 1992, about a thousand people were killed on each side. But more significantly, about 100,000 Ossetians fled Georgia and South Ossetia and went into North Ossetia. About 23,000 ethnic Georgians fled South Ossetia and went into Georgian territory. The war ended through a Russian-brokered ceasefire that established a joint peacekeeping force and left South Ossetia divided between the rivaling authorities.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991%E2%80%931992_South_Ossetia_War
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3797729.stm
On 14 August 1992, the territory of Abkhaz fought for independence from Georgian rule. The war lasted about 16 months, and in that time the war exhibited gross human rights violations. The combination of indiscriminate attacks and targeted terrorizing of the civilian population was a feature of both sides’ deliberate efforts to force the population of the other party’s ethnic group out of areas of strategic importance.2 The practice was adopted first by the Georgian side, in the second half of 1992, and later, more effectively, by the Abkhaz side. Russia supported Abkhaz’s independence and were extensively involved in the war, providing military equipment and logistics and even troops. Russian aircraft bombed and Russian ships shelled Georgian sites. The war led to massive ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Georgians and Abkhazians.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm
The war between Georgia and Abkhaz ended in May 1994 with the Moscow Agreement, a cease fire between both sides. It established a demilitarized zone between the two countries where no heavy military equipment could be based. It also established that a peace keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States and observers from the UN, to be deployed to the region.
http://www.undemocracy.com/S-1994-583.pdf
Back to 2004, Russia’s support of Aslan Abashidze cannot be geographic. Abkhaz and Ossetia are on Russia’s border. see map here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Georgia_high_detail_map.png
But Ajaria is on the southern border of Georgia and is not geographically or ethnically tied to Russia. Instead Russia’s support of Aslan Abashidze should probably be viewed as Russia supporting anyone who opposes Georgia, as in “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” sort of thing.
Also, by this time (2004), Russia was granting citizenship to many residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
22 January 2006, The Mozdok-Tbilisi pipeline in the Russian border region of North Ossetia was sabotaged by two separate explosions, one on the main branch and one on the reserve branch. The electricity transmission line in Russia’s southern region of Karachayevo-Cherkessiya – also near the Georgian border – was brought down by an explosion just hours later. The effect was to cut gas and electricity from Georgia in the middle of winter. The coordination of the explosions led to accusations that Russia had sabotaged its own lines to punish Georgia.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4638566.stm
March 2007, Georgia claims that three Russian helicopters attacked the Georgian government in exile at the Kordori Gorge in Abkhazia. Russia denies their aircraft were involved in any attack.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Georgia_helicopter_incident
August 2007, Georgia claims that Russian aircraft violated Georgian airspace and fired a missile which landed but did not explode in Tsitelubani in the Gori district near the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. Russia denies any involvement and claims Georgia may have fired or planted the missile as a way of escalating tension between the two states.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Georgia_missile_incident
August 2007, Georgia claims it shot down a Russian fighter jet that had violated its airspace over Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region. Abkhazia’s break-away government confirmed that a plane went down, but denies that it was shot down.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Georgia_plane_downing_incident
By March of 2008, Russia had announced that it would no longer participate in the Commonwealth of Independent States economic sanctions imposed on Abkhazia in 1996. Shalva Natelashvili, leader of the Labour Party of Georgia, warned Abkhazia would be “finally separated from Georgia” and cited the lifting of sanctions as the first sign. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, raised similar concerns about the dropping of trade restrictions saying, “That could look like a de facto annexation and that would be a matter of great concern if it were the case.”
Also in March of 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia both submitted formal requests for recognition of their independence as a response to the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state.
On 16 April 2008, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was going to recognise some documents issued by the separatist authorities and cooperate with them on trade and other issues. Putin also instructed his government to recognise businesses and organisations registered under Abkhaz and South Ossetian law, and to look at providing consular services to residents in the two regions. Georgian Foreign Minister David Bakradze said Russia’s move amounted to a “legalisation of the de facto annexation process” being conducted by Russia and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged Russia to reverse the move and called for restraint from Georgia. Russian officials have warned that a move by Georgia to join NATO could force Russia to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
20 April 2008, a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was shot down over the Abkhazian conflict zone. Abkhazia’s separatist administration immediately said its own forces shot down the drone because it was violating Abkhaz airspace and breached ceasefire agreements. However, a UN investigation of the UAV recordings shows that it had been shot down by a Russian fighter plane. The UN also noted that the UAV qualified as a military aircraft and therefore Georgia had in fact violated the cease fire agreement.
Russia increased the number of its peacekeepers in Abkhazia to 2,542 peacekeepers, which is 458 short of the 3,000 limit set by cease fire agreement.
On May 18, 2008 Georgia detained five Russian peacekeepers along the administrative border with the Abkhazia region claiming that their armoured personnel carrier collided with a Georgian woman’s car, in the town of Zugdidi. The peacekeepers were later released. Alexander Diordiev, a Russian peacekeeping official, confirmed the detention of the Russian soldiers but said there was no collision and instead that Georgians provoked the peacekeepers in an attempt to discredit the Russian presence.
June 14 and 15, mortar fire and an exchange of gunfire were reported between South Ossetian and Georgian forces. OSCE monitors went to the site of the clashes however it was not determined who fired the first shot. One person was killed and four wounded.
31 May, 2008, Russia sent its railway troops, allegedly unarmed, to repair a railway line in Abkhazia. Georgia condemned the move as an act of aggression aimed at preparing a full-scale intervention. Russia’s defense minister said the railroad troops would leave within two months after they’ve finished work on the railroad. The troops finished pulling out of Abkhazia on 30 July 2008
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Georgia-Russia_crisis
7 August 2008, the South Ossetia War erupts.
According to the monitors, at 3 p.m. on Aug. 7, large numbers of Georgian artillery and rocket launchers massed on roads north of Gori. At 6 pm, Russian peacekeepers reported Georgian artillery fire on Khetagurovo, an Ossetian village.
At 7pm, Georgia declared a unilateral cease-fire.
At 11 pm, Georgia TV announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and declared an operation “to restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia. The bombardment of Tskhinvali started soon after the broadcast. Georgia claimed that 4 villages had been shelled. However, monitors were stationed in 2 of those villages and they reported no shelling.
11:35 pm, monitors in Tskhinvali reported that they started receiving incoming fire from Georgian artillery. By 12:30, monitors had recorded at least 100 artillery shells had landed in and around Tskhinvali, including 48 which had landed near the monitor’s offices, which was in a civilian area. By the morning of August 8, Russian forces in Tskhinvali reported that two Russian soldiers had been killed by the shelling and five had been wounded.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/world/europe/07georgia.html
Mikhail Saakashvili wanted Georgian troops to seize the Roki Tunnel which separates South Ossetia from North Ossetia and cut the Russians off from being able to counterattack. However, Georgia failed to secure the tunnel, and a large Russian force (~150 tanks?) poured through the tunnel in response to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4500160.ece
Russia responded by sending troops into South Ossetia and launching bombing raids further into Georgia. One day later Russian and Abkhazian forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia and invaded western parts of Georgia’s interior. Russian naval forces blocked Georgia’s coast. Almost all Georgian naval units were scuttled by Russian forces at Poti naval pier on 13 August. After five days of heavy fighting, Georgian forces were ejected from South Ossetia and Russian troops invaded Georgia proper, occupying cities of Poti and Gori among others.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_South_Ossetia_war
Georgia’s response to South Ossetia in 2008 appears quite similar to Georgia’s response to Aslan Abashidze in Ajaria in 2004. In 2004 Georgia sent troops into Ajaria to unseat the separatists. And Mikhail Saakashvili seems to have learned one lesson from that earlier fight, namely the importance of geography. In 2004, when Mikhail Saakashvili tried to bring Aslan Abashidze and Ajaria under Georgian control, the Ajaria blocked the bridges over the Choloki river and prevented Mikhail Saakashvili from entering the country. In 2008, Mikhail Saakashvili’s first military goal was to seize the Roki Tunnel separating North Ossetia in Russia from South Ossetia, in an effort to cut the Russians off from South Ossetia. Georgian forces failed to grab the tunnel, though, and the Russian military poured through the tunnel.
However, something I believe is a much more fundamental difference between Ajaria and Ossetia, a difference that I do NOT believe that Mikhail Saakashvili understood, was the “hearts and minds” factor. In May of 2004, Mikhail Saakashvili was hugely popular with Georgians, having just risen to power via the Rose Revolution of November 2003, having overthrown a corrupt politician who had tried to steal the election. Ajarian’s identify themselves with Georgia. And when Aslan Abashidze started using military and police to crack down on protests, opposition leaders, and critics, the people of Ajaria swung against Aslan Abashidze. More importantly, they saw Mikhail Saakashvili, the reformer from the year before, as the answer to their problem.
In August 2008, South Ossetia was heavily leaning towards separating from Georgia. Many South Ossetians ethnically identify themselves with Russia. When Mikhail Saakashvili attempted to preemptively attack the leadership of South Ossetia, the local population did not view their leadership as corrupt and did not view Mikhail Saakashvili as the reformer who would save them. They viewed him as an invader.
The lesson Mikhail Saakashvili seems to have missed is this: Georgia, Abkhazia, and Ossetia have as recently as the 1990’s engaged in brutal open military wars with each other and massive war crimes against each other’s civilian populations. Georgia and Ajaria do not have this same sort of history between them. Abkhazia and Ossetia identify themselves more as Russian than Georgian. The people of Ajaria do not hold themselves so apart from Georgia.
Mikhail Saakashvili promised after the Rose Revolution that he would unite Georgia. Apparently, he is willing to unite people and lands with Georgia even if they do not want to be united.
And while Mikhail Saakashvili came to power as the “reformer” ousting a politician who tried to steal the election, that doesn’t mean Mikhail Saakashvili is actually a reformer. He may be better than Eduard Shevardnadze was, but that doesn’t mean he didn’t launch a war of aggression against Ossettia.
If nothing else, Mikhail Saakashvili failed as a leader to navigate the minefield that is the relationship between the people of Georgia, Ossettia, Abkhaz, and Russia. In a situation where a light touch seems required, Mikhail Saakashvili has shown a history of escalations and his invasion of Ossetia in 2008 seems to be little more than hubris combined with a poor understanding of the local history and people of those he invaded. And his crackdown on critics and dissidents and opposition leaders within his own Georgia seems to point to the idea that maybe power has become more important to Mikhail Saakashvili than reform.
Russia too has shown a penchant for escalations around Georgia. This is not to say that Mikhail Saakashvili is wholly to blame for the current relations between Georgia, Ossetia, Abkhaz, and Russia. But Mikhail Saakashvili appears to have picked the fight in August 2008. Maybe Mikhail Saakashvili thought the West would come to his aid. Maybe he simply didn’t think it was possible he would lose. I don’t know.
I’m not sure what the solution is other than to ask Georgia and Russia to cool it. With such a brutal and vicious and recent history, I don’t think there is any easy solution. Georgia and Russia out? Some kind of UN peacekeeping mission? Russian peacekeepers seems to be little more than the fox guarding the hen house at this point. I don’t know.
However, if there is one thing that is clear to me right now, it is that Georgia should not be made a member of NATO until the issues between Georgia, Ossetia, Abkhaz, and Russia are resolved. As it is, Mikhail Saakashvili’s attempt to join NATO seems to me to be nothing more than an attempt to leverage NATO to be his military arm in his efforts to force Ossetia and Abkhaz under Georgian control. The last thing NATO needs is for Mikhail Saakashvili to invade Ossetia again, and when the Russians counterattack, suddenly all of NATO must go to war to support Mikhail Saakashvili’s mission for dominance.
Oh, and if there is one OTHER thing that is clear to me, it is how much an issue such as the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia can only be accurately viewed through the lense of history. And so, I’ve got Georgia on my mind.
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